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EMPLOYMENT LAW
Robert T. Billingsley*
Thomas J. Dillon, III**
I. INTRODUCTION
This article surveys the judicial and legislative developments in
Virginia employment law between June 1990 and June 1991. De-
velopments in the areas of worker's compensation and unemploy-
ment compensation, each of which has its own distinctive body of
law, are outside the scope of this article.
During the period covered by this article there were few signifi-
cant judicial developments in the area of employment law. Several
cases dealt with the topic of wrongful discharge, with both the Su-
preme Court of Virginia and Virginia's circuit courts adding to the
growing body of law in this area. The courts also continued to
wrestle with the reasonableness test for covenants not to compete.
But, the most extensive developments in the area of employment
law area occurred in the legislative arena. The Virginia General As-
sembly adopted a number of legislative changes to the Code of Vir-
ginia ("Code") which affect Virginia employment law and practice.
II. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. Wrongful Discharge Litigation
With its decision in Falls v. Virginia State Bar,' the Supreme
Court of Virginia finally resolved a debate that had been raging
among Virginia employment law specialists for a number of years.
The debate concerned the applicability of the statute of frauds2 to
* Principal, Hirschler, Fleischer, Weinberg, Cox & Allen, P.C., Richmond, Virginia; A.B.,
1976, College of William and Mary; J.D., 1980, The T.C. Williams School of Law, University
of Richmond.
** Associate, Hirschler, Fleischer, Weinberg, Cox & Allen, P.C., Richmond, Virginia; B.A.,
1987, Richmond College, University of Richmond; J.D., 1990, The T.C. Williams School of
Law, University of Richmond.
1. 240 Va. 416, 397 S.E.2d 671 (1990).
2. The Virginia statute of frauds provides, in pertinent part, that "[u]nless a promise,
contract, agreement, representation, assurance, or ratification, or some memorandum or
note thereof, is in writing and signed by the party to be charged or his agent, no action shall
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an oral employment contract providing for "just cause" dismissal.
The issue was first addressed by the court in Silverman v.
Bernot.3 In Silverman, an employer had orally promised his em-
ployee that if she would remain in his service until she reached age
sixty-two or until his death, whichever occurred first, she would
receive a pension for the rest of her life. The court first observed
that the crucial inquiry under the statute of frauds is whether a
contract could be performed fully on either side within a year from
its effective date. It then held that the contract was not invalidated
by the statute of frauds since it could have been performed fully
within a year after its effective date - for example, if the em-
ployer had died.4 The court thus distinguished between termina-
tion of a contract by operation of law and completion by perform-
ance. The court also suggested that the statute of frauds defense
might have succeeded if the contract had provided only for the em-
ployee to work for the employer until age sixty-two.5
Thereafter, in Frazier v. Colonial Williamsburg Foundation,"
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia held that the statute of frauds did not apply to an oral "just
cause" employment contract because such a contract "could be
performed within one year since, for example, [the employee]
could have been discharged for cause within a year of having been
hired."'7 Although the Fourth Circuit ultimately rejected this hold-
ing because of the district court's failure to observe the distinction
made in Silverman between "termination by operation of law" and
"completion by performance", 8 Frazier provided a glimmer of hope
to plaintiffs seeking to overcome the statute of frauds defense. All
sides anxiously awaited the decision of the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia in Falls v. Virginia State Bar.
be brought ... [u]pon any agreement that is not to be performed within a year ... " VA.
CODE ANN. § 11-2(8) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
3. 218 Va. 650, 239 S.E.2d 118 (1977).
4. Id. at 654-55, 239 S.E.2d at 121.
5. Id. at 654-55, 239 S.E.2d at 121-22.
6. 574 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Va. 1983).
7. Id. at 320.
8. In Windsor v. Aegis Servs., Ltd., 691 F. Supp. 956 (E.D. Va. 1988), aff'd per curiam,
869 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1989), Judge Ellis of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia rejected the Frazier holding and held that an oral "just cause" employ-
ment contract is unenforceable under the statute of frauds because it cannot be performed
fully within a year. In a per curiam opinion, the Fourth Circuit subsequently affirmed and
adopted Judge Ellis' decision. Windsor v. Aegis Servs., Ltd., 869 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1989)
(per curiam).
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In Falls, the former Director of Administration for the Virginia
State Bar alleged that he had been hired by the Bar with verbal
assurances that his employment would continue "as long as his
performance was satisfactory."9 When Falls was subsequently dis-
charged, allegedly without cause, he filed a suit against the Bar
alleging breach of his employment contract. The trial court con-
cluded that the statute of frauds barred enforcement of Falls' oral
employment contract, thus sustaining the Bar's demurrer and dis-
missing Falls' action. 10
On appeal, Falls argued that the statute of frauds was inapplica-
ble because his employment contract was capable of being per-
formed within a year, upon the occurrence of any one of three
events: his death, resignation or discharge for cause." The Su-
preme Court of Virginia, however, rejected Falls' argument. Recal-
ling the distinction drawn earlier in Silverman between termina-
tion of a contract by operation of law and completion of a contract
by performance, the court stated:
Although occurrence of any of the three contingencies mentioned
by Falls would have terminated his performance during the first
year of his employment, the parties' contract did not expressly pro-
vide that the occurrence of any of these contingencies would consti-
tute full performance. Absent such an agreement, upon occurrence
of any of those contingencies, Falls' contract would end, not by per-
formance, but by termination .... Because Falls' contract contains
no such provision providing for full performance in the event of
those contingencies, the statute of frauds is applicable."2
Another recent decision addressed the applicability of the "pub-
lic policy" exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. In the
1985 decision of Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville,3 the Su-
preme Court of Virginia recognized a "narrow exception" to the
employment-at-will doctrine for discharges in violation of public
policy. Because the court reaffirmed the validity of the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine and declined to expand the public policy ex-
ception so as to provide redress for purely private rights or inter-
9. Falls, 240 Va. at 418, 397 S.E.2d at 672.
10. Id. at 417, 397 S.E.2d at 672.
11. Id. at 418, 397 S.E.2d at 672.
12. Id. at 419, 397 S.E.2d at 672-73.
13. 229 Va. 534, 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985).
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ests," Virginia courts have been unwilling to apply the public
policy exception except in cases where the discharge was either in
response to the employee's refusal to commit an unlawful act or a
result of the employee's exercise of a statutory right.
Despite the narrowness of the public policy exception to the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine, discharged employees continue to try to
bring their cases within the exception. For example, in Bussey v.
Arlington County Residences, Inc.,15 an at-will employee claimed
that her discharge from her job of placing mentally retarded per-
sons in group homes was in response to her refusal to make place-
ments "contrary to the federal and state regulations regarding
placements of retarded individuals."Is Observing that an "em-
ployee asserting a wrongful discharge as against public policy must
be a member of the class to be protected by a public right estab-
lished by a law", 17 the Circuit Court of Arlington County held that
the employee had failed to identify any established public policy or
specific law violated by her dismissal. 8 Accordingly, the circuit
court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment and
dismissed the employee's wrongful discharge claim.
While every employment relationship is contractual in nature,",
either party to an at-will employment relationship may end the re-
lationship at any time for any reason, or for no reason at all, upon
giving reasonable notice to the other.2 0 Thus, a wrongful discharge
claim is a cause of action in tort rather than contract. 21 In Hayslett
v. Harriott Family Restaurants, Inc.,22 an employee alleged that
14. In Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc., 234 Va. 462, 362 S.E.2d 915 (1987), an employee claimed
that she had been discharged because she appeared as a witness at a fellow employee's
grievance hearing. The supreme court, however, refused to allow her wrongful discharge
claim to proceed on public policy grounds, stating that the "narrow exception" to the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine recognized in Bowman did not provide redress for discharges vio-
lative of purely private rights or interests. Id. at 467-68, 362 S.E.2d at 918.
15. No. 89-1069 (County of Arlington Cir. Ct. Nov. 2, 1990).
16. Id., slip op. at 1.
17. Id., slip op. at 4.
18. Id.
19. See Humphrees v. Boxley Bros. Co., 146 Va. 91, 97, 135 S.E. 890, 891 (1926) (holding
that "[t]he relation of employer and employee can only exist by virtue of contract, express
or implied").
20. Miller, 234 Va. at 465, 362 S.E.2d at 917.
21. See Bowman v. State Bank of Kempsville, 229 Va. 534, 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985). The
court in Bowman stated: "[c]onsequently, applying a narrow exception to the employment-
at-will rule, we hold that the plaintiffs have stated a cause of action in tort . Id. at 540,
331 S.E.2d at 801 (emphasis added).
22. 20 Va. Cir. 496 (County of Rockbridge Cir. Ct. 1990).
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she had been discharged by her employer , because she had filed a
workers' compensation claim 23 and had reported certain account-
ing irregularities to her employer's personnel manager. Unfortu-
nately, because the employee failed to file suit within the two-year
statute of limitations applicable to tort actions,24 the action was
dismissed by the Circuit Court of Rockbridge County.25
The existence of an alternative, exclusive remedy may also bar a
wrongful discharge action. In Pruitt v. Johnston Memorial Hospi-
tal, Inc.,2" an employee alleged that her employer had failed or re-
fused to provide her with a safe work environment and that, de-
spite her repeated complaints, the employer had allowed the
unsafe conditions to persist. Ultimately, when these conditions
forced her to quit, she filed suit against her employer alleging that
she had been constructively discharged from her employment.7
The Circuit Court of Washington County rejected the employee's
argument. Holding that sections 40.1-51.2 through 40.1-51.3.2 of
the Code provide the exclusive remedy for an employee who has
been denied a safe work environment, the court sustained the em-
ployer's demurrer and dismissed the employee's wrongful dis-
charge claim.28
23. Section 65.1 of the Code provides a cause of action against an employer that dis-
charges an employee "solely because the employee intends to file or has filed a claim under
[the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act] or has testified or is about to testify in any pro-
ceeding under this Act." VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-40.1 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
24. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243.A (Repl. Vol. 1984) ("[u]nless otherwise provided by
statute, every action for personal injuries, whatever the theory of recovery, except as pro-
vided in B hereof, shall be brought within two years next after the cause of action shall have
accrued.").
25. Hayslett, 20 Va. Cir. at 498.
26. 21 Va. Cir. 188 (County of Washington Cir. Ct. 1990).
27. Id.
28. Section 40.1-51.2(b) of the Code provides that an employee may file a complaint of
hazardous conditions with the Virginia Department of Labor and Industry and thereby
cause an inspection of the workplace "to be made as soon as practicable" by the Depart-
ment. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-51.2(b) (Repl. Vol. 1990). The court's opinion in Pruitt indicates
that the employee had not availed herself of this right. Had she done so and been dis-
charged or discriminated against as a result, the employee then would have had an actiona-
ble claim against her employer under § 40.1-51.2:1, which provides: "No person shall dis-
charge or in any way discriminate against an employee because the employee has filed a
safety or health complaint or has testified or otherwise acted to exercise rights under the
safety and health provisions of this title for themselves or others." VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-
51.2:1 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
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B. Restrictive Covenants
1. Covenants Not to Compete
Unfortunately, Virginia courts provided little enlightenment in
the area of restrictive covenants during the period covered by this
article. Indeed, the opinions of the Virginia circuit courts remain
as varied as the facts of each case.29 As a consequence, counsel for
employers remain uneasy about drafting restrictive covenants and
counsel for employees frequently are unable to provide clear guid-
ance concerning their clients' duties under such covenants.
Most of the confusion in the area of restrictive covenants results
from ambiguity in Virginia's three-pronged reasonableness test.30
Traditionally referred to as the "Rule of Reasonableness", 31 the
test was adopted by the Virginia Supreme Court in 1956.32 Al-
though every Virginia case since 1956 has recited this test,33 analy-
sis of the decisions suggests that the courts continue to apply an
earlier test. Before 1956,
[t]he test to be applied to the question whether an agreement not to
engage in a certain business is violated by accepting employment in
that business, has been said to be whether in its scope and charac-
ter, the employment is such as to result in all likelihood in substan-
tial interference with the business which was the subject of the
29. Compare Kida v. Chesterfield Veterinary Clinic, 19 Va. Cir. 95 (County of Chester-
field Cir. Ct. 1990) (entire restriction unenforceable) with Consolidated Indust. Roofing, Inc.
v. Williams, 17 Va. Cir. 341 (City of Roanoke Cir. Ct. 1989) (partial enforcement).
30. In Roanoke Eng'g Sales Co. v. Rosenbaum, 223 Va. 548, 290 S.E.2d 882 (1982), the
supreme court articulated a three-pronged test for determining the reasonableness of a re-
strictive covenant:
(1) Is the restraint, from the standpoint of the employer, reasonable in the sense
that it is no greater than necessary to protect the employer in some legitimate busi-
ness interest?
(2) From the standpoint of the employee, is the restraint reasonable in the sense
that it is not unduly harsh and oppressive in curtailing his legitimate efforts to earn a
livelihood?
(3) Is the restraint reasonable from the standpoint of a sound public policy?
Id. at 552, 290 S.E.2d at 884.
31. Note, Employee Covenants Not To Compete: Where Does Virginia Stand?, 15 U.
RICH. L. REV. 105, 117-18 (1980).
32. Meissel v. Finley, 198 Va. 577, 95 S.E.2d 186 (1956).
33. See, e.g., Grant v. Caroteck Inc., 737 F.2d 410, 412 (4th Cir. 1984); Alston Studios,
Inc. v. Lloyd V. Gress & Assoc., 492 F.2d 279, 282 (4th Cir. 1974); Blue Ridge Anesthesia &
Critical Care, Inc. v. Gidick, 239 Va. 369, 389 S.E.2d 467 (1990); Roanoke Eng'g Sales Co. v.
Rosenbaum, 223 Va. 548, 552, 290 S.E.2d 882, 884 (1982); Foti v. Cook, 220 Va. 800, 805, 263
S.E.2d 430, 433 (1980); Richardson v. Paxton Co., 203 Va. 790, 794, 127 S.E.2d 113, 117
(1962); Meissel v. Finley, 198 Va. 577, 580, 95 S.E.2d 186, 187 (1956).
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contract. 4
While no longer recited by the courts, this test appears to live on
through its application by the courts. Indeed, the only certain rule
is that Virginia does not favor restrictive covenants.
3 5
For example, in Johnson v. E.R. Carpenter Co., Inc.,36 the owner
of a company sold his business but remained with the company as
a vice president. An employment contract was not part of the sales
agreement between the parties. However, following the sale of the
business, the new owner presented the former owner with an em-
ployment contract containing a restrictive covenant on a "take-it-
or-leave-it" basis.3 7 After the former owner signed the contract, he
was terminated. Thereafter, the employer sought to enforce the
terms of the restrictive covenant.
Traditionally, because of the more equal bargaining power that
generally exists between buyers and sellers, the courts do not scru-
tinize restrictive covenants involved in the sale of businesses as
strictly as those entered into between employers and employees.3 8
Nevertheless, in Johnson, the Circuit Court of the City of Rich-
mond refused to enforce the restrictive covenant between the par-
ties. Despite the recent holding of the Supreme Court of Virginia
in Paramount Termite Control v. Rector,3 9 the court rejected the
covenant for lack of consideration. In doing so, the court drew a
distinction between restrictive covenants presented to employees
as a "condition of their continued at-will employment" and those
that are imposed without the opportunity for continued employ-
ment.40 The court also refused to grant injunctive relief under the
doctrine of unclean hands.41
34. Stoneman v. Wilson, 169 Va. 239, 247, 192 S.E. 816, 819 (1937).
35. Grant v. Caroteck, Inc., 737 F.2d 410, 411 (4th Cir. 1984); Alston Studios, Inc. v.
Lloyd V. Gress & Assocs., 492 F.2d 279, 285 (4th Cir. 1974); Stoneman v. Wilson, 169 Va.
239, 247, 192 S.E. 816, 818 (1937).
36. 20 Va. Cir. 380 (City of Richmond Cir. Ct. 1990).
37. Id. at 385. The evidence showed that the employee had relocated his family from
California and no longer had the option to back out of the deal.
38. The disparity of bargaining power between employers and employees is, perhaps, the
factor that most frequently influences courts to void restrictive covenants appearing in em-
ployment contracts. See, e.g., Richardson v. Paxton Co., 203 Va. 790, 127 S.E.2d 113 (1962).
39. 238 Va. 171, 380 S.E.2d 922 (1989). In Paramount, the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that an at-will employee's continued employment provided the consideration necessary
to support a post-employment restrictive covenant.
40. Johnson, 20 Va. Cir. at 387.
41. Johnson, 20 Va. Cir. at 387 (citing Everett v. Bodwell, 185 Va. 405, 38 S.E.2d 319
(1946)).
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It is clear from the court's opinion in Johnson that the timing of
the contract was the pivotal factor in its decision. Indeed, the court
suggested that if the employment contract had been bargained for
and concluded as part of the sale of the business, the covenant
would have been enforceable.42
In another case, Kantor v. Health Innovations, Inc.,4 3 the circuit
court examined a restrictive covenant precluded the employee
from directly or indirectly soliciting business from the employer's
clients for one year. When the employee subsequently went to
work for a former customer of the employer, the employer filed
suit. Surprisingly, the employer sued the customer rather than the
former employee, alleging a violation of the Virginia Uniform
Trade Secrets Act.44 However, because the employer did not allege
that the customer had tortiously interfered with or induced a
breach of the employee's terminable at-will contract, the trial court
sustained the customer's demurrer and dismissed the suit.45 The
court thus avoided having to evaluate the enforceability of the
covenant.
2. Covenants Protecting Trade Secrets
In Dionne v. Southeast Foam Converting & Packaging, Inc.,46 a
former employee of the defendant, a family-owned manufacturer,
left the business to begin a competing enterprise. Because the em-
ployee possessed knowledge of a secret manufacturing process that
he intended to use in his new business, the company promptly filed
suit against him, seeking to enforce the terms of a confidentiality
agreement. On the basis of a Michigan federal court decision, the
employee argued that he could not be found guilty of misappropri-
ating a trade secret that he "personally developed or substantially
contributed to developing while employed at SEFCO. ' '47 The court,
however, rejected the employee's argument, observing that Vir-
ginia's Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines "misappropriation" as
the "[d]isclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express
or implied consent by a person who . . . knew or had reason to
know that his knowledge of the trade secret was . . . [a]cquired
42. Id. at 385.
43. No. 116727 (County of Fairfax Cir. Ct., Aug. 9, 1990).
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-336 to -343 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
45. Kantor, No. 116727, slip op. at 2.
46. 240 Va. 297, 397 S.E.2d 110 (1990).
47. Id. at 303, 397 S.E.2d at 113.
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under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or
limit its use ..
C. Other Judicial Developments
In Singleton v. International Association of Machinists,49 the
supreme court reaffirmed Virginia's authority to prohibit union se-
curity agreements. In Singleton, a private employer at Washington
National Airport terminated a non-union employee under a collec-
tive bargaining agreement that required the employer to condition
its employment contracts upon a employee's union membership.
Although the employee was rehired after he reluctantly joined the
union, he brought suit against the union for violation of Virginia's
right-to-work laws.50 Because both the state and federal govern-
ments share police power jurisdiction over National Airport by vir-
tue of the Metropolitan Washington Airports Act,51 the court was
asked to determine whether Virginia's right-to-work law (which
forbids union security agreements) or federal law (which permits
them)52 controlled. Citing a provision of the federal Labor Manage-
48. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-336(2)(b)(2) (Repl. Vol. 1987).
49. 240 Va. 403, 397 S.E.2d 856 (1990).
50. Virginia's right to work law is reflected in sections 40.1-58, -59, -60, -65, -67 of the
Code of Virginia.
Section 40.1-58 provides: "It is hereby declared to be the public policy of Virginia that the
right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of membership or non-
membership in any labor "union or labor organization." VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-58 (Repl. Vol.
1990).
Section 40.1-59 provides:
Any agreement or combination between any employer and any labor union or labor
organization whereby persons not members of such union or organization shall be
denied the right to work for the employer, or whereby such membership is made a
condition of employment or continuation of employment by such employer, . . . is
hereby declared to be against public policy and an illegal combination or conspiracy.
Id. § 40.1-59.
Section 40.1-60 provides: "No person shall be required by an employer to become or re-
main a member of any labor union or labor organization as a condition of employment or
continuation of employment by such employer." Id. § 40.1-60.
Section 40.1-65 provides: "Any agreement, understanding or practice which is [designed]
to cause or require any employer. . . to violate any provision of this article is hereby de-
clared to be an illegal agreement, understanding or practice and contrary to public policy."
Id. § 40.1-65.
Section 40.1-67 provides: "Any. . . person. . . injured as a result of any violation. . . of
any provision of this article . . . shall be entitled to injunctive relief against any and all
violators. . . ." Id. § 40.1-67.
These sections were recognized by the court in a footnote. Singleton, 240 Va. at 404-05 n.1,
397 S.E.2d at 857 n.1.
51. 49 U.S.C. § 2458(c) (1990).
52. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1990); see Oil Chem. & Atomic Workers v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426
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ment Relations Act,53 the court upheld Virginia's authority to pro-
hibit union security agreements.54
Unlike their private counterparts, most public employers in Vir-
ginia are required by law to establish and maintain a grievance
procedure for their employees. During the past year, the supreme
court addressed two appeals arising from grievance proceedings. In
Zicca v. City of Hampton,5 an employee was dismissed from his
position as a golf course superintendent because he allegedly made
inappropriate remarks to his supervisor. Following a hearing, a
grievance panel directed the city to reinstate the employee "to his
former position as Golf Course Superintendent with full back-pay
less thirty (30) working days which will be shown as a disciplinary
suspension in his record." '56 Despite this directive, when the em-
ployee returned to work, he was assigned to a temporary position
in the city's Aerospace Park and later was transferred to a newly-
created position of maintenance manager.5 7 The employee filed
suit, asking that the city be required to reinstate him to his former
position as golf course superintendent. The trial court dismissed
the suit, finding that the city had complied technically with the
decision of the grievance panel.5 8
On appeal, the supreme court reversed, holding that the griev-
ance panel's decision was binding on the city.5 9 The court charac-
terized the city's reinstatement of the employee to his original po-
sition and its reassignment of him to a new position on the
following day as "merely subterfuges" by which the city had at-
tempted to circumvent the panel's decision. 0
In another grievance procedure case, Tazewell County School
Board v. Gillenwater,6 ' an intermediate school teacher filed an ap-
peal of her annual performance evaluation. The teacher alleged
U.S. 407, 416 (1976).
53. The court observed that § 164(b) of the Labor Management Relations Act provides, in
pertinent part, that "[niothing in this [Act] ... shall be construed as authorizing the execu-
tion or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condi-
tion of employment in any State. . .in which such execution or application is prohibited by
State . . law." 240 Va. at 406, 397 S.E.2d at 859 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 164(b)(1990)).
54. Singleton, 240 Va. at 407, 397 S.E.2d at 859.
55. 240 Va. 468, 397 S.E.2d 882 (1990).
56. Id. at 469, 397 S.E.2d at 882-83.
57. Id., 397 S.E.2d at 883.
58. Id. at 470, 397 S.E.2d at 883.
59. Id. at 471, 397 S.E.2d at 883.
60. Id.
61. 241 Va. 166, 400 S.E.2d 199 (1991).
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that the principal who conducted the evaluation had violated sev-
eral procedures governing teacher evaluations.6 2 The appeal was
unsuccessful. Approximately one year later, the board informed
the teacher that she was being transferred to an elementary school.
Alleging that the transfer was an act of reprisal for the appeal she
had filed the preceding year, the teacher filed a statement of griev-
ance.6 3 Both the superintendent of schools and the school board
denied the grievance, concluding that personnel transfers were not
subject to the grievance procedure.6 4 The trial court, however, dis-
agreed and held that the teacher's allegations were subject to the
grievance procedure.6 5
On appeal, the supreme court reversed. Although the court ac-
knowledged that "acts of reprisal as the result of utilization of the
grievance procedure" fell within the definition of grievance, 66 it ob-
served that the teacher had alleged that her transfer was an act of
reprisal for having filed an appeal of her evaluation, and that the
school board's evaluation plan was not part of the statutory griev-
ance procedure.6 Moreover, the court observed that the grievance
procedure applicable to public school teachers in Virginia expressly
excludes matters pertaining to the "transfer [or] assignment.
of teachers within the school division."68
Finally, in a case of first impression in Virginia, the Circuit
Court of Virginia Beach allowed an employee to seek personal in-
jury damages in a breach of contract action against her employer.
In Guffey v. Virginia Beach General Hospital,"9 a hospital em-
ployee was abducted and raped as she arrived for work. Alleging
that her employer had breached its agreement to "provide security
officers who would patrol the premises and afford protection to
both patients and staff", 0 the employee sought damages for "pain
and suffering resulting from bodily injury and mental anguish from
humiliation and permanent deformity. '7 1
The employer demurred to the employee's claim for personal in-
62. Gillenwater, 241 Va. at 167-68, 400 S.E.2d at 199.
63. Id. at 168, 400 S.E.2d at 200.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-306 (Repl. Vol. 1985).
67. Gillenwater, 241 Va. at 170, 400 S.E.2d at 201.
68. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-306 (Repl. Vol. 1985)).
69. 21 Va. Cir. 401 (City of Virginia Beach Cir. Ct. 1990).
70. Id. at 402.
71. Guffy, 21 Va. Cir. at 402.
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jury damages. It argued that damages for breach of contract are
limited to the pecuniary loss sustained, and that "pecuniary losses
are limited to those items that can be clearly measured in mone-
tary terms and do not include pain and suffering or mental anguish
and humiliation. ' 72 The circuit court, however, rejected the em-
ployer's argument. Observing that "[u]nder contract law, a party
who proves a breach of contract is entitled to recover for damages
sustained as a result of that breach, ' 73 the court concluded that
the employee should be allowed to pursue her claim for personal
injury damages under a breach of contract theory. To rule other-
wise, the court held, would deprive the employee of a remedy
under the employment contract solely because of the nature of her
lOSS. 7 4
III. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
During its 1991 session, the Virginia General Assembly enacted a
number of legislative changes in the area of employment law.
These changes occurred primarily in Title 40.1 of the Code, but the
legislature executed a number of other changes as well.
The General Assembly amended and reenacted sections 2.1-716
and 2.1-717 of the Virginia Human Rights Act75 by expanding the
definition of "unlawful discriminatory practice" to include conduct
violative of any state or federal law prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital
status or disability.76 The definition previously was limited to vio-
lations of state law, the Civil Rights Act of 1964,7 7 and the Fair
Labor Standards Act.78 This is an important and timely amend-
ment in light of Congress' recent enactment of the Americans With
Disabilities Act.7 '9
The legislature also increased Virginia's minimum wage, as es-
tablished in section 40.1-28.10 of the Code. From its effective date
on July 1, 1991 until July 1992, the minimum wage will be in-
creased from $1.00 per hour to $3.65 per hour. Thereafter, Vir-
72. Id. at 403.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 404.
75. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-714 to -725 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
76. Id. § 2.1-716 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 200a to 200h-6 (1990).
78. 29 U.S.C. § 201-19 (1990).
79. Pub. L. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990).
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ginia's minimum wage will be set at a rate not less than the federal
minimum wage.80 The General Assembly also added an important
enforcement mechanism by providing that employees may retain
private attorneys to collect moneys owed by employers as the re-
sult of noncompliance with the minimum wage provision.8 1
The General Assembly also added several new sections to the
Virginia Occupational Health and Safety Act82 to provide for the
registration of Virginia contractors found guilty of flagrant viola-
tions of the Act. Again, the legislature sought to buttress these
changes with an enforcement mechanism. The commissioner was
granted the authority to assess interest and collect past-due penal-
ties for violations of the Act.8 3
Finally, the General Assembly enacted wholesale changes to Vir-
ginia's statutorily-imposed local government grievance procedures.
Significant portions of sections 15.1-7.1 and 15.1-7.2 of the Code
were amended, and responsibilities and procedures were rede-
fined.8 4 Most of section 15.1-7.1, which dealt with the establish-
ment of a grievance procedure, was deleted and little of substance
was added. In addition, all but the title of section 15.1-7.2 was de-
leted and replaced with detailed information concerning defini-
tions, responsibilities, coverage and compliance.
80. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.10 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
81. Id. § 40.1-29(F) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
82. Id. §§ 40.1-135 to -138.
83. Id.
84. Compare id. § 15.1-7.1, -7.2 (Repl. Vol. 1989) with id. § 15.1-7.1, -7.2 (Cum. Supp.
1991).
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